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Likewise, to ask ‘what is the use-value of the work or labour 
of art’1 would, more often than not, open up an alternative 
set of debates and assumptions about utility, function, 
purpose, and instrumentalized culture. It also followed that 
these two kinds of debates pointed toward a fundamental 
schism or divide within Western culture, between the 
autonomy of art and the heteronomy of everyday life, which 
it was the sole purpose of the historical avant-garde to 
somehow bridge or reconcile. In doing so, it was also 
assumed that the historical avant-garde might be able 
to also offer us both aesthetic and political alternatives 
that would help us to imagine ways of living otherwise. 
However, over the last decade or so it has become 
far more common for those involved in the art world to 
propose that art occupies both the spaces of autonomy 
and heteronomy. To put this another way, it has now 
become safer to assume that art’s use-value and/
or purpose (or useless use-value and purposeless 
purpose if you prefer) is that it allows us to keep both 
the seemingly irreconcilable opposites of autonomy 
and heteronomy in a kind of useful tension. Coinciding 
roughly with the 2002 publication in New Left Review 
of Jaques Rancière’s ‘The Aesthetic Revolution and its 
Outcomes: Emplotments of Autonomy and Heteronomy’2 
the idea that a broader ‘politics of aesthetics’ represents 
an overarching metanarrative (within which the very 
struggle for meaning is played out through complex forms 
of shifting interaction) has allowed for a radical rethink of 
the role, function, and purpose of art within the terms and 
conditions of of globalized neoliberalism. At its weakest, 
this way of thinking has led to a form of pseudo-radicalism 
1 I use the phrase ‘work or labour of art’ throughout this essay as a means to both identify,  
separate (and re-conjoin) three common and problematic senses or distinctions concerning our 
understanding of art: first, the ‘work of art’ seen as either an autonomous entity to be experienced  
as an isolated phenomena; second, the idea of the work of art as an autonomous entity which is 
imbued with, or somehow embodies, the work (as craftsmanship and skill) and labour (as time and 
effort spent) on the production of the art object itself—this idea is usually synonymous with the 
ideology of authorship; and third, the idea of the labour of art as either an individual or collective 
process, often ‘open-ended’ which is separate to, and usually bracketed off from, the art object  
(or work of art) in senses one and two.
2 Jacques Rancière, ‘The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes: Emplotments of Autonomy  
and Heteronomy,’ New Left Review 14 (March–April 2002), pp. 133–135.
Until relatively recently, asking ‘what kind of work  
is the work of art’ would immediately open up a well-
rehearsed discourse surrounding a range of familiar 
and received wisdoms. More often than not, these 
romanticized clichés and sedimented forms of common 
sense depended, almost exclusively, on the deployment 
of a set of key terms and conditions that framed the 
specific role and function of art and artists in Western 
culture and society: alterity, aesthetic autonomy, 
artistic vision, and an almost messianic commitment 
to the ideology of the artist as secular shaman.
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whereby art is seen as a collective noun that can somehow 
string together a range of practices and experiences 
that combine both the concrete and the ephemeral—the 
luxury commodity form of the art object sold at auction 
on the one hand and ground-up forms of collaborative 
social intervention on the other. At its best, this possibility 
has led to a range of projects, practices, and initiatives, 
undertaken by artists, museums, and galleries alike, which 
are attempting to renegotiate the Western split between 
art and life. This, in turn, is opening up the possibility 
of fundamentally renegotiating the existing structures 
of accepted institutional relationships that make art 
possible—artist, artwork, audience, museum, gallery, etc., 
through practices of constellation thinking, coproduction, 
and a commitment to active forms of usership. 
At the same time as this, it also becomes clear that the 
more art as we know it (or knew it) changes, the more the 
old boundaries blur, the harder it becomes to tell what or 
where art is anymore.3 Usually, the two answers to this 
difficulty are quite extreme—either hold on fiercely to 
what we already know to be art, or let art finally merge, 
unrecognizably, within the all-encompassing texture of 
everyday life. Such polarities, of course, return us directly 
to the bifurcatory logic of autonomy (where art is seen 
to provide a rebuff against instrumentalized culture) and 
heteronomy (where there no longer exists a case for art 
as a useful category in itself). Because of this, I would 
argue that it is becoming increasingly necessary to reuse 
history as a contemporary means of navigating between 
the Scylla and Charybdis of autonomy and heteronomy 
and to help us imagine alternative forms of future. 
An example of this reuse of history was recently given 
to us by art historian and philosopher Georges Didi-
Huberman in his article ‘The Supposition of the Aura: The 
Now, The Then, and Modernity.’4 Here, Didi-Huberman 
3 See John Byrne, ‘Critical Autonomy: Inside Out – Outside In,’ The Autonomy Newspaper # 1: 
Positioning (Onomatopee 43.1 2010), pp. 14–21. 
4 See Georges Didi-Huberman, ‘The Supposition of the Aura: The Now, The Then, and Modernity,’  
in Walter Benjamin and History, ed. Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2005).
argues against an over-simplistic use of Walter Benjamin’s 
work, specifically his 1936 text ‘The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction,’5 as a means to inscribe the 
‘death’ of the ‘aura’ of an artwork. Instead, Didi-Huberman 
advocates convincingly for a more sophisticated and 
dialectical sense of the ‘aura’ which is embedded in 
Benjamin’s work as a ‘falling away’: a ‘supposition’ of the 
auratic quality of an artwork which subsequently haunts 
any attempt to rethink the ‘loss of originality.’ This idea of a 
history as decline, of a history which haunts the present—
rather like the barely visible calligraphic inscriptions that 
always lurk beneath any attempt at palimpsest—implicates 
history as the imperfect negotiation of erasure in order 
to rewrite. In this sense the lessons of history, for Didi-
Huberman, are never simply there to be learnt, as if they 
somehow present an archival index of a future that was 
yet to be. Instead, the act of history is always a process of 
becoming. As Didi-Huberman, via Benjamin, puts it ‘decline 
… is part of the “origin” so understood, not the bygone—
albeit founding—past, but the two-way flow of a historicity 
that asks, without respite, even to our own present, “to be 
recognized as a restoration, a restitution, as something 
that by that very fact is uncompleted, always open.”’6
Such an active use of history, of literally allowing 
ourselves to go back to the future and to remind 
ourselves of a time when art functioned in very different 
ways, would allow us to begin actively recuperating the 
period circa 1848. This was a period of radical thinking, 
of John Ruskin and Mechanics’ Institutes, a period in 
which art still occupied a useful role in the production 
of new forms of citizenship. Crucially, this was a time 
before art and utility, autonomy and everyday life, had 
gone their own seemingly irreconcilable ways. An active 
use of this history would, I would argue, provide us 
with the means to begin reimagining our own current 
5 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (New York: Penguin,  
2008 [1936]). There are also many versions of this essay which can be found online including  
www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm.
6 Didi-Huberman, ‘The Supposition of the Aura,’ p. 4.
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situation. This would also allow us to begin the task 
of rethinking art and the kind of work, or labour, that 
the work of art has become (and is still becoming).
In my own research, this operation of returning to the 
future has led to an ongoing analysis of use-value and 
exchange-value, in relationship to contemporary art, 
via Marx.7 More specifically, I have become interested 
in Marx’s insistence on a bodily/mental split between 
use-value and exchange-value as a means to re-imagine 
the shifting and complex relationships between autonomy 
and heteronomy within our increasingly networked and 
globalized neoliberal economy. In the early pages of 
Das Kapital, for example, Marx attempts to separate out 
use-value from exchange-value in any consideration of 
the commodity form. However, as Fredric Jameson has 
recently pointed out in his book Representing Capital: A 
Reading of Volume One,8 this separation also belies a more 
fundamental and metaphysical distinction in the work 
of Marx between qualitative materiality and quantitative 
abstraction. By arguing that use-value does not matter to 
the capitalist who wishes to sell commodities for profit, 
Marx simultaneously proposes that use-value in the 
commodity form is, at best, subsidiary to its potential as 
exchange-value. One could go as far as to say that, for 
Marx, the supposition of use-value by exchange-value 
and profit was the defining condition for the development 
of the commodity form under capitalism. In doing so, 
Marx both externalizes use-value from the quantitative 
and abstract procedures of the commodity form (and its 
purpose as a vehicle for profitable exchange). At the same 
time he privileges use-value as something qualitative 
and material, something that both precedes and becomes 
lost from the commodity form under capitalism. To put 
this another way, use-value comes to be seen as the 
7 John Byrne, ‘Back to the Future: Grizedale Arts, Use Value and the Work of Art’ available at 
Grizedale Arts New Mechanics Institute Library, www.grizedale.org.
8 See Fredric Jameson, Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One (London: Verso, 2011),  
pp. 19–20.
bodily and socially produced necessity to satisfy basic 
human needs and to ensure the continued development 
of the means of production. It could also be argued that 
Marx’s attempt to separate use-value (as qualitative 
bodily physicality) from exchange-value (as quantitative 
mental abstraction) ensures that any subsequent 
consideration of the commodity form is haunted, at every 
turn, by the absence of that which it can never fully be. 
Marx presents us here with a now familiar ethical 
and moral hierarchy which clearly places qualitative 
bodily materiality above quantitative mental abstraction 
and, ultimately the productive over the ideological. His 
separation of use-value and exchange-value in the 
commodity form also marks a historical juncture. This is 
the point at which any calls for a future beyond capitalism 
begin to be predicated on use-value and, more often than 
not, on the valorization of ethical forms of non-alienated 
work and labour as an inalienable human right. We must, 
however, remember that the work of Marx was itself also 
formed and conditioned by this very same historical 
separation—a division between real and material forces 
and the abstraction of work or labour, within the growing 
mechanisms of capitalism, into the mental and judiciary 
formulation of structures which govern and contain us.9  
It is precisely at this historical moment—roughly the mid-
nineteenth century—that we begin to witness the opening 
up of the familiar gap between art and life. Within this gap 
the possible complexity (and the potential use-value that 
the work or labour of art could embody or represent within 
this complexity) begins to get lost. It is also from this point 
onward that it becomes possible for the development 
of a European avant-garde which can imagine its job 
or work to be that of reuniting art and life. As we also 
know, it is under the aegis of this unificatory logic that 
both art’s autonomy (as a resistance to the onslaught of 
9 For example, as Raymond Williams pointed out in his 1977 book Marxism and Literature, Marx’s own 
ideas were themselves determined by, and have to be read against, the tumultuous conditions of the 
Industrial Revolution and its concomintant faith in empirical science. One of the key examples Williams 
uses here is Marx’s assertions that the economic conditions of a determining base of material forces 
could be read with the accuracy of a science.
I.
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mechanized industrialization) and art’s utility (as a means 
of harnessing the power of mechanized industrialization as 
aestheticized revolutionary potential) begin to be offered 
up as possible avant-garde solutions to this division.
By returning to the past in this way, it becomes clearer 
to see the complexity of legacy that we have inherited from 
this period—a complexity which is obfuscated by the overly 
simplistic notion of an autonomy/heteronomy divide. On 
the one hand, the future of art carries with it the possibility 
of conceiving both autonomy and heteronomy, via use-
value, as complex forms of interaction. On the other, the 
existing infrastructures of art that we have inherited 
from this period, predicated as they are on the narrow 
conception of an autonomous art that is capable of staving 
off the alienating horrors of industrialization, would seem to 
militate against the very idea of such complex interaction. 
However, to bring us sharply back to our present cultural 
condition, we might well ask what happens to the 
role and function of art when, as theorist and activist 
Franco Berardi argues, the hallmarks of modernist 
avant-garde resistance have long since been co-opted 
by the rhetorics of financial capitalism, and, more 
specifically, by the economically driven model of the 
culture industries.10 If this is the case, then artists, or 
for that matter art institutions which see themselves 
as progressive progenitors of artistic possibility, can no 
longer simply reach out to the well-rehearsed mantras 
of artistic autonomy and cultural alterity. As both left 
and right increasingly occupy the same territory of 
rhetorical discourse surrounding freedom and community, 
the implications for our traditional understandings of 
the work or labour of art would appear to be stark.11
Berardi offers one way of thinking and working  
ourselves out of this melancholic dead end. In his recent 
10 See Franco Berardi, After the Future (Oakland: AK Press, 2011).
11 For a stark account of the artist as ‘at best the ultimate freelance knowledge workers and at  
worst barely capable of distinguishing themselves from the consuming desire to work at all times,’ 
see Liam Gillick, ‘The Good of Work,’ e-flux journal 5, no. 16 (2010), www.e-flux.com/journal/the-good-
of-work.
book The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance,12 he argues  
that the radical deregulation of neoliberal capital is 
predicated upon the increasing abstraction of language 
from the body. Deregulatory logic, he suggests, relies on 
the possibility of endlessly connecting and reconfiguring 
language into regulated, recombinable and meaningless 
components. This, he points out, runs counter to the 
open, porous, and poetic use of language as a fluid 
form of conjunction—as an endlessly open means of 
understanding ourselves and each other through evolving 
forms of communication and growth. In light of this,  
Berardi proposes that the new job of the artist or poet 
is to return non-alienated forms of porous, mutable, and 
productive language to the physical and social body.  
By recombining language, autonomy and production in 
this way, Berardi also allows us to go back to the future. 
We can then begin rethinking the potential of radical 
alternatives while at the same time, returning to the social 
and historical bifurcation of use-value and exchange-value. 
More specifically, Berardi insists on the distinction 
between abstract and connective forms of language 
from material and conjunctive uses of language. In doing 
so he consciously replays Marx’s struggle with the 
codependency of use-value and exchange-value and its 
development, through the imposition of capitalism, of 
abstracted forms of use-value as an ideological means 
of measurement and calibration. In this way, we can 
see clear parallels beginning to emerge. On the one 
hand, between connective forms of language and the 
quantitative abstraction of exchange-value. On the other, 
between conjunctive and productive uses of language 
with the bodily necessity of use-value. Here, the use of 
language provides a material means to challenge the 
established status quo of economic predicates and 
determinates through the material production of new 
social meanings, and autonomies. These are themselves 
capable of escaping the gravity of power and its reliance 
12 See Franco Berardi, The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012).
II.
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on increasingly interchangeable, centralized, and regulated 
forms of connectivity. In this scenario, the job of the artist 
or poet becomes the work or labour of keeping language 
alive when there are no longer any simple distinctions 
between autonomy and heteronomy. If this is the case, then 
it also follows that the work or labour of art is no longer to 
unite, bridge, or combine the seemingly irreconcilable—
it is to operate as a form of autonomous and social 
possibility, or use-value, within an already networked 
and saturated world of deregulatory and delusory logic.
Berardi begins to offer us a useful resource for strategically 
rethinking what kind of work, or labour, the work of art 
has now become within a globalized and networked 
neoliberal economy; that of returning an instrumentalized 
and abstracted language, reconfigured as a porous and 
mutable form of poetry, to the physical and social body. 
But how, we might then ask, is it possible to imagine 
(let alone effect) such a strategy within a dispersed 
and networked society that is already predicated upon 
forms of alienation, instrumentalization, and abstraction 
on every level? And how can we even begin to imagine 
forms of resistance and organization, based upon the 
use-value of art, when all forms of traditional organization 
and resistance (class, race, gender, religion, sexuality, 
party affiliation) seem to be collapsing into each other 
under the weight of flexibilization and the exploitation of 
precarious labour? How does one radicalize, collectively 
or individually, when all faith in the mechanisms of 
inherited political affiliation would seem to be lost?
One way of beginning to think this conundrum through,  
I would argue, is again offered by Rancière. However, I’m 
not thinking of Rancière’s suggestion of a metapolitics  
of aesthetics here—as a means of usefully rethinking  
the interconnectedness and emplotments of political  
and aesthetic activities that are, fundamentally, made  
of the same stuff (of a politics and aesthetics that are  
both, in essence, mechanisms for the re-distribution of  
the sensible, or of making ‘sense of sense and sense’  
as Rancière puts it). Instead I’m thinking here of the 
Rancière of ‘The Nights of Labour: The Workers’ Dream  
in Nineteenth-Century France,’13 of the Rancière who  
looks back to the future at the historical struggle of 
artisans, workers and craftsmen who used writing—and  
the growing availability of ground-up political publications 
in the 1840s—as a means to reuse and challenge existing 
languages of power and control. In doing so, Rancière 
consciously avoids the trap of projecting a revolutionary 
and proletarian class who is yet to be—a mythologized 
class somehow standing at the ready to free itself from the 
shackles and yoke of capitalist oppression (when, and only 
when, it is brought to the full consciousness of its own 
servitude by enlightened bourgeois revolutionaries). 
Instead, he weaves a more plausible picture of everyday 
micropolitical dissent—a rhizomatic reuse of the existing 
languages of mastery made by a class that is already fully 
conscious of its own fixed position within the hierarchies  
of power. For Rancière, this already existing class of fully 
conscious workers, who are willing to reuse a language 
that is always too mutable and porous to be owned 
completely by the hand of their masters, contains within  
it more revolutionary potential than an idealized and 
abstracted proletariat to be: 
A worker who had never learned how to write and 
yet tried to compose verses to suit the taste of his 
times was perhaps more of a danger to the prevailing 
ideological order than a worker who performed 
revolutionary songs. … Perhaps the truly dangerous 
classes are not so much the uncivilized ones thought 
to undermine society from below, but rather the 
migrants who move at the borders between classes, 
individuals and groups who develop capabilities within 
themselves which are useless for the improvement 
13 See Jacques Rancière, The Nights of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-Century France 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
III.
Fig 1 Alexander Rodchenko, 
Soviet Workers’ Club, 1925
122 123
What’s the Use? Constellating History John Byrne History, Use-Value, and the Contemporary Work or Labour of Art
of their material lives and which in fact are liable 
to make them despise material concerns.14
This kind of work or labour, this continual reuse and 
reconfiguration of the possibilities offered by language, 
technology, and existing architectures and protocols 
of power is now, I would contend, the kind of work, 
or labour, that the work of art has now become. It is 
epitomized by the struggle for meaning that is the root 
of collaborative propositions such as Arte Útil and the 
new Museum 3.0,15 and which resides at the heart of 
projects such as Grizedale Arts’s Office of Useful Art.16 
However, in a sense, this leads us straight back to the key 
difficulty I pointed to earlier on: How might we envision a 
useful work or labour of art based around the use-value of 
conceiving both autonomy and heteronomy as a complex 
emplotment through which the struggle for meaning is 
played out? More specifically, how is it possible if to do so 
would seem to decisively re-invoke a traditional bifurcation 
between art and life? Again, I would argue that it is now 
more necessary than ever to reuse history as a means to 
navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of autonomy 
and heteronomy. Additionally, it is equally important to 
do this through using the past as a means to imagine our 
possible futures, to escape the strong gravitational pull of 
our own inherited structures of understanding. Another 
14 See Jacques Rancière, ‘Good Times or Pleasures at the Barriers,’ in Voices of the People, ed. Adrian 
Rifkin and Roger Thomas (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1988), pp. 51–58. This essay appeared 
originally as ‘Le bon temps ou la barrière des plaisirs,’ Les Révoltes logiques 7 (Spring–Summer 1978), 
pp. 25–66.
15 In his book Toward a Lexicon of Usership (which is available as a free .pdf at the Arte Útil website, 
www.arte-util.org/tools/lexicon/www), Stephen Wright argues that museums and galleries have 
already adopted elements of Web 2.0 culture insofar as they are relying more heavily than ever on 
audience participation, feedback, and knowledge production. Wright goes on to speculate that a more 
radical shift toward the Museum 3.0 may be underway, one which will see the complete breakdown 
in the museum/audience divide. Instead, we will see the development of coproduced/open-source 
museums as both online and offline shared resources. 
16 The Office of Useful Art is a vehicle for developing ideas of an open source and user-led museum 
and gallery experience which is coproduced through the active making of art. I have described one 
of the first iterations of this mechanism, which took place in 2010 as part of the São Paulo Biennial, in 
my article ‘Back to the Future: Grizedale Arts, Use Value and the Work of Art,’ cited previously. Since 
then the Office of Useful Art has amalgamated with artist Tania Bruguera’s Association of Arte Útil and 
has manifested itself in Tate Liverpool and Ikon Gallery, Birmingham. There is now a permanent Office 
of Useful Art at Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art (under the directorship of Alistair Hudson) and 
also further plans to continue developing this project.
key example of (or ‘blueprint’ for) this kind of historical 
methodology that helps us understand the problematic 
bifurcation of autonomy and heteronomy—and its potential 
use-value for radical change—is found in T. J. Clark’s 
Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism.17 
In his discussion of the Abstract-Expressionist painter 
Jackson Pollock, Clark makes an astonishing assertion: 
‘Modernism is Craftmanship’ he declares ‘even in its 
wildest moments.’18 Here, Clark refers to a particular 
outtake of a Hans Namuth film in which Pollock appears 
to be using two brushes that have been fused together 
by dried paint. He uses this as a tool for carefully dripping 
his own paint at a consistent and variable speed onto 
a floor-based canvas. By making this assertion, and by 
using this particular example, Clark usefully confronts a 
complex process here. In doing so, he studiously avoids 
any attempt to normalize it. In the act of Pollock’s making, 
Clark suggests that ‘there had to be built in a whole series 
of obstacles to aesthetic freezing and framing. Aesthetic 
decision-making had somehow to be ingested into the act 
of manufacture, the de-skilled address to the surface from 
above.19 Perhaps even more interestingly, Clark then goes 
on to quote from Hegel’s The Unhappy Consciousness by 
identifying this decision-making moment as ‘the positive 
moment of practicing what it does not understand.’20
By analyzing Pollock’s methodology in this way, Clark 
takes us right back to Hegel’s identification of modernity as 
a moment in which both self-sameness and contingency 
(or, for the sake of our argument, autonomy and 
heteronomy) tragically confront one another as opposites. 
‘The “Simple Unchangeable” on one side, the “protean 
Changeable” on the other,’21 as Clark succinctly puts it. At 
this point in history, absolute individuality (undividedness) 
and the endlessness of difference confront each other in 
17 See T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism (New Haven:  
Yale University Press, 1999).
18 Ibid., p. 328.
19 Ibid., p. 328–329.
20 Ibid., p. 329.
21 Ibid., p. 329.
IV.
Fig 3 Hans Namuth, Jackson 
Pollock painting in his studio 
at Springs, Long Island, 1950, 
gelatine silver print
Fig 2 Grizedale’s Arts’s Office 
of Useful Art, Grizedale 
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what, for Hegel, is the essence of Spirit or Consciousness: 
the being together of the both in one. But the essence of 
modernity, for Hegel, was also its failure to grasp this—and 
this, of course, is also the root of our bifurcatory logic. The 
unhappy consciousness knows this bifurcation but simply 
cannot accept it. These two sides of self-consciousness 
are, for the ‘unhappy consciousness,’ alien to each other. 
So far, so familiar. However, Clark also goes on to 
remind us (regarding Hegel) that, because the unhappy 
consciousness is itself the product of this division—
brought into being, if you like, by the very friction of this 
opposition—it sides with the changeable consciousness 
(heteronomy) and ‘takes itself to be the unessential Being.’ 
Therefore, the real problem for Clark (again, regarding 
Hegel), lies in the inability of the unhappy consciousness 
to ‘lay hold of mere difference and embrace it as its Truth 
because difference turns on indifference, and contingency 
on essential nature.’22 As a consequence of this (and 
through, as Hegel defines it, a series of ‘movements of 
surrender’—first of all the right to decide for itself, then 
of the right to decide its property and enjoyment and, 
finally, through the positive moment of practicing what it 
does not understand) the unhappy consciousness ‘truly 
and completely deprives itself of the consciousness 
of inner and outer freedom, of the actuality in which 
consciousness exists for itself. It has the certainty of 
having truly divested itself of the “I,” and of having turned 
its immediate self-consciousness into a Thing, into and 
objective existence.”23At this point, Clark usefully reminds 
us that the movements of surrender that Hegel had in 
mind are those of modern religion and its forms and, for 
Clark, the way in which ‘the religious surrenderings have 
been extended and amplified by those of art.’ Clark then 
goes on to conclude this remarkable section of his book 
by stating that: “this would be the level on which even 
the self-satisfied Leftist claptrap about ‘art as a substitute 
22 Ibid., p. 329.
23 Ibid., p. 329.
religion’ might be reworked so as to have some critical 
purchase … . To investigate why God is not Cast Down.”24
This return to Hegel, via Clark, as a means to 
re-understand the necessity of Modernity’s bifurcatory 
project, as well as its own essential misunderstanding 
of the conditions of its possibility as a bringing together 
of those bifurcatory opposites is, I would say, crucial 
here. If the self-sameness of identity (of autonomy, of 
a God who is not cast down) thereby underpins the 
very means of our surrender to an endless difference 
(and eventual indifference) of heteronomy, in which 
our self-identity is just one objectifiable contingency 
amongst others, then, by proxy, the endless fractalization 
through which neoliberal logic would alienate us from 
our own bodies does not, indeed cannot, guarantee 
the inevitability of our total surrender to this logic. 
In this sense, the return of language to the body, 
which Berardi would advocate was now the job of the 
artist, would also depend (dare I say for its revolutionary 
success) upon the aesthetics of decision making being 
‘somehow’ ingested—as we have already seen Clark put 
it in his analysis of Pollock—‘into the act of manufacture, 
the de-skilled address to the surface from above.’ A 
willful act, if you like, of re-inscribing precisely that line 
of bifurcatory distinction which modernity, and by proxy 
the avant-garde, sought so hard to ameliorate and undo. 
However, this time the re-inscription of this bifurcatory 
line would not be a decisive act of foreclosure or censure. 
Instead, it would be to allow, once again, the conjunctive 
‘working through’ of art and life, use-value and exchange-
value, as a means to reopen the possible dynamic of real 
social change, as the being together of the both in one. 
This sense of a reframing manufacture, as we have also 
seen, is for Hegel ‘the positive moment of practicing what 
it does not understand.’ It can also help us to repurpose 
Rancière’s historical identification of a worker who 
attempts to reuse the available languages of mastery 
24 Ibid., p. 329.
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as a means to create alternative possibility. In so doing, 
they might keep alive a sense of agency within the all-
encompassing confines of global neoliberalism. We can 
then, again, imagine that it is those migrants who refuse 
their place, who move between and across the fractalized 
borders of our endlessly networked culture, who are 
most effective in the production of real social change.
However, it is at this point, above all, that we must 
not fall back into the romantic trap of reinvesting the 
familiar object with the magical ability to negatively resist 
the ravages of the culture industry. Instead, if we are at 
the point where it is possible to reimagine our future 
through a revolutionary participation in a period of true 
change, then we must also allow our notion of art—what 
it can be, who can make it, where it can gain visibility, 
and how it can be used—to radically mutate. As such, 
the artwork now belongs as but one nodal point within 
a network of choices and refusals. In light of this, the 
craft of history is, of course, no longer the act of bearing 
transparent witness to ontological certitude. The use-value 
of art has now become the work of tracing a strategic 
pathway back through those rhizomatic networks of 
choice and refusal. It has become the collaborative use 
of art as a means to actively rework our histories as a 
political means to negotiating our alternative futures. 
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